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Affirmative Action and A Free Press:
Policies and Problems in Promoting
the First Amendment
DON LIVELY*
The first amendment furnishes a constitutional assurance that the
media generally can say what it wants rather than what the government
wants it to say. But the negatively structured terminology that bars
Congress from abridging freedom of the press,' does not preclude the
government from accentuating the positive and promoting first amend-
ment interests. The freedom of the press clause, unlike the freedom of
religion clause, contains no antiestablishment bar precluding affirma-
tive governmental action.2
Two centuries of technological change have drastically altered the
face and force of communications and have created conditions that are
ripe for affirmative action. The United States Supreme Court has ac-
knowledged the "vast changes [that have placed] in a few hands the
power to inform the American people and shape public opinion 3 ...
[and that] raise serious questions of diversity of information and opin-
ion."4 The Court recognized those emerging realities three decades ago
* Law clerk for Hon. Jim R. Carrigan, Judge, U.S. District Court, Denver, Colorado (1979-
80). A.B., University of California, Berkeley; M.S., Northwestern University; J.D., University of
California, Los Angeles.
1. U.S. CONST., amend. I.
2. Id.
3. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 250 (1974).
4. Id. at 250 n.15.
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when it concluded that
[i]t would be strange indeed ... if the grave concern for freedom of
the press which prompted adoption of the First Amendment should
be read as a command that government was without power to protect
that freedom.
Such reasoning provides a basis for drafting government into the role
of constitutional soldier in the service of first amendment values. But
although the Court has supplied a banner, the government still must
determine how to lead the crusade against the forces that would over-
run the interests of diverse voices and viewpoints, which are the essence
of first amendment concerns. The purpose of this article is to examine
the changing realities that require new policies to promote the first
amendment, to evaluate existing government programs designed to
promote the first amendment, and to propose several affirmative ac-
tions designed to protect first amendment values.'
THE FIRST AMENDMENT: NEW POLICIES FOR NEW REALITIES
The wording of the first amendment has remained unaltered since its
drafting, but circumstances in which it operates have changed signifi-
cantly. Framers composed the first amendment long before the term
(or reality of) "mass media" had emerged and at a time when ideas and
opinions generally competed for attention and acceptance in the com-
munity forum.' Face-to-face interaction was the hallmark of such dis-
course in the late 18th century, when the dynamics of public opinion
were analogous to those of a free economic marketplace.
The architects of the Constitution wrote a first amendment that was
designed to prevent interference with the stream of information and
ideas that flowed primarily from soapboxes and pamphlets.' Given the
limited means of disseminating information at the time, it is unlikely
that the framers could have visualized the emergence of a mass com-
munications business. Given the technology of the times, it is improba-
ble that they even could have fantasized the forces that would
5. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
6. Judge Learned Hand wrote that the interest in the dissemination of news from many
different sources
and with as many colors as possible.., is closely akin to, if indeed it is not the same as,
the interest protected by the First Amendment; it presupposes that right conclusions are
more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than through any kind of
authoritative selection. To many this is, and always will be folly, but we have staked
upon it our all.
United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (1943), a'd 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
7. Yudof, When Governments Speak-- Toward a Theory of Government Expression and the
First Amendment (unpublished paper delivered at the First West Coast Conference on Constitu-
tional Law, Sept. 15, 1977) at 26-28; Media and the First.4mendment in a Free Society, 60 GEo.
L.J. 871, 878-80 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Media and the First Amendment].
8. Media and the First Amendment, supra note 7, at 871.
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transform a basic public function into a highly profitable industry (or
the methodology that would accomplish that transformation).9
The first amendment was forged from the underlying conviction that
a free flow of information was the best protection against government
tyranny of the mind and that uncensored thought was essential to the
proper functioning of society."° Such reasoning lends itself to an argu-
ment that the first amendment was designed as much for the benefit of
the public as for the interests of publishers. And no matter how drasti-
cally conditions have changed or will continue to change, the interests
of both remain on the charter list of first amendment-protected species.
The free press clause, in the context of the period which shaped it,
was designed to eliminate the threat of government censorship. 1' Pro-
tection against government interference, therefore, was afforded the
transmission of information by speakers, newspapers, pamphlets, and
books. 12
The primary restriction upon dissemination of information was a rel-
atively primitive means of conveyance. The spoken word was shackled
by the range of the human voice, and the printed word was handi-
capped by limited distribution systems. The comparatively underde-
veloped transmission system nonetheless was amenable to diversity,
since the motive for public speaking and publishing more often was to
present partisan views rather than to make money.13 Diversity was the
primary beneficiary of the fashionable custom of using newspapers to
conduct political feuds. George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, John
Adams, Benjamin Franklin, and Alexander Hamilton each shared the
common experience of forming or financing newspapers to further their
individual political goals and compete with other partisan voices.' 4
The mutation of communications enterprises from tools of persua-
sion to instruments of profit, however, has been accompanied by a sig-
nificant reduction in competition. The United States in 1800, for
instance, enjoyed the services of 235 newspapers, including 24 dailies.15
The number of daily newspapers expanded to 2,400 by 1909, with 689
9. Alexis de Tocqueville wrote that "Americans have nowhere established any central direc-
tion of opinion, any more than of the conduct of affairs .... In America, there is scarcely a
hamlet that has not its newspaper." A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 185-88
(1969).
10. Media and the First Amendment, supra note 7, at 871.
I1. Id. at 876.
12. Id. at 876-79.
13. The purpose of persuasion rather than profit is illustrated by the fact that most pamphlets
were distributed to the public at no charge. A. SCHLESINGER, PRELUDE TO INDEPENDENCE 44-45
(1957).
14. Comment, New Challenges to Newspaper Freedom of the Press-The Strugglefor Right of
Access and Attacks on Cross-Media Ownership, 24 DE PAUL L. REv. 165, 168 (1974).
15. Id. at 169.
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cities having competing dailies. 6 But by 1970, the number of daily
newspapers had shrunk to 1,728, and only 42 cities were served by dai-
lies that were separately owned.1 7 Although new electronic sources of
information had emerged, they frequently were another arm of the
same body that controlled a newspaper in the same market.,
The media concentration process has been characterized by the
emergence of advertisers, rather than consumers or publishers, as the
main subsidizers of the media. Since a basic business interest is to keep
important customers satisfied, the advertiser may operate as a subver-
sive element against the interests of diversity. The coverage or promi-
nence of a controversial or sensitive story, for example, may be
influenced by a real or perceived danger of alienating a financial con-
tributor.'9 Such purse strings power by its very existence, therefore,
can operate as a constricting force upon the flow of information.
The framers of the Constitution, on the basis of their experience and
observations, drew a reasonable conclusion that government posed the
major threat to a free flow of information.20 But their vantage point
afforded no opportunity to see beyond the horizon of an intervening
century. And since the drafters did not address what they could not
foresee, their document was constructed oblivious to the eventual stir-
rings of economic forces that eventually would subordinate face-to-face
communications to mass communications. The first amendment,
which was shaped by the experiences that led to one revolution, thus
became ultimate law long before another revolution ushered in a lock-
step of mass technology and mass communications.
The first amendment was well-tailored to suit a free marketplace of
ideas, which functions when:
[t]he people are presented with problems. They discuss them. They
decide them. They formulate viewpoints. These viewpoints are
organized, and they compete. One viewpoint "wins out." Then the
people act out this view, or their representatives are instructed to act
it out, and this they promptly do.2 1
But the face-to-face competition of individuals and ideas that charac-
terized society at the time of the first amendment's creation has been
16. Id. at 170 n.18.
17. EDITOR AND PUBLISHER, April 4, 1970, at 6.
18. A total of 160 television stations in 1970 had newspaper affiliations. Id.
19. McDonald, The Media's Conflict of Interests, THE CENTER MAGAZINE, Nov.-Dec. 1976,
at 19-20. And a programmer or publisher may tend toward bland, noncontroversial programming
or publishing to avoid any risk of offending advertisers. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412
U.S. 94, 187-89 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
20. See T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF ExPREssION 627 (1970); Chatzky and
Robinson, A Constitutional Right of 4ccess to Newspapers: Is There Life After TornIlo?, 16 SANTA
CLARA L. REv. 453, 456 (1976); Media and the First Amendment, supra note 7, at 876.
21. C. MILLS, PowER, POLITICS AND PEOPLE 357 (1953).
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supplanted largely by the dissemination of prefabricated, synthesized
information by centralized communications networks. A communica-
tions industry has diminished "the ratio of communicators to receivers,
made the possibility of answering back more difficult as face-to-face
discussions decline, and, to some degree, allowed instituted authorities
to 'infiltrate the public' so as to interfere with the autonomy of the pub-
lic.
' 2 2
The emergence of institutionalized centers of communication has
transformed radically the methodology of information exchange and
competition. The primary mode of communication in pre-mass media
America was interpersonal discussion. Newspapers and pamphlets
served to "enlarge and animate discussion, linking one primary public
with the discussions of another."2 3 The dominant means of communi-
cation in a mass media society, however, "is by the formal media ...
[T]he public becomes media markets. . exposed to the contents of
given mass media."'
4
The same first amendment that was designed to protect against
abuses from centers of public power has seen the United States in gen-
eral, and communications in particular, undergo a transition "from
widely scattered little powers and laissez-faire to concentrated powers
and attempts at monopoly control from . . centers of private
power."25 Given the shift from decentralized public debate and easy
entry to concentrated information centers and limited entry, the free
marketplace of ideas concept seems to have become antiquated. Nev-
ertheless, first amendment analysis remains anchored to a romantic as-
sumption of personal interaction and exchange of ideas rather than
being geared to an information infrastructure dominated by strong eco-
nomic forces.26 The realities of society as they exist nearly 200 years
after the first amendment was drafted suggest that it now may be more
fitting to consider communications
not entirely in terms of Eugene Debs' speeches 7 or Abrams' written
heresies, 28 but also in terms of a sophisticated, complex, massive and
intrusive phenomenon that is subject to control by powerful forces,
the most powerful of those being large economic enterprises, the
mass media and government.2 9
22. Id. at 353-55.
23. Id. at 355.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 581.
26. The Supreme Court, for instance, looked to the marketplace of ideas as a rationale for
upholding a fairness requirement for broadcasters. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S.
367 (1969).
27. Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
28. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
29. Yudof, When Governments Speak-- Toward a Theory of Government Expression and the
Pacific La;' Journal / Vol 11
Thus, although the media, which controls the flow of information,
has changed considerably since the Constitution was drafted, first
amendment analysis of the protection of this information remains
rooted in interpersonal communications theory. This is not to say that
the government has ignored the changed environment in which in-
formation flows, but rather that current programs promoting the first
amendment within this changed environment have been ineffective.
The next section of this article will examine the rationale behind gov-
ernmental attempts to ensure the continued free flow of information
and the necessary diversity of sources of this information.
PROMOTING THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The marketplace of ideas concept still furnishes a useful analogy for
first amendment theory and analysis. But the make-up of the market-
place has shifted from a decentralized and laissez-faire marketplace to
a monopolistic and regulated one. Although neither marketplace is
guided entirely by laissez-faire principles, neither is totally regulated by
government. Such a setting affords a climate that is conducive to a
middle-of-the-road policy of balancing first amendment values and
first amendment rights. This balancing process, which results in gov-
ernment programs designed to promote first amendment values, re-
quires a two-step analysis.
Affirmative first amendment policy-making first must ascertain
whether the interests of diversity are being served and, second, deter-
mine whether a hands-off or hands-on policy would be more promo-
tional. Government action under the banner of the first amendment,
even though it is legitimate,3 ° often may step upon as many interests as
it serves. At least four often-competing concerns must be factored into
any positive equation. Such interests include those of information dis-
seminators in using their media as vehicles of self-expression, 3' those of
consumers in receiving information,32 those of groups and individuals
in obtaining access so that competing ideas can be delivered,33 and
those of society in having the media educate and protect.34
Prevailing first amendment policies and analysis afford neither equal
First Aendment (unpublished paper delivered at First West Coast Conference on Constitutional
Law, Sept. 15, 1977) at 24.
30. See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
31. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974); CBS v. Democratic
Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 120-21 (1973).
32. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969); Martin v. City of Struthers,
319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943).
33. A general right of public access was denied in CBS . Democratic National Committee,
412 U.S. 94, 121-25 (1973).
34. Media and the First Amendment, supra note 7, at 888.
1979 / Affirmative Action
weight nor equal opportunity to all competing interests.3 5 The conse-
quent juggling of conflicting first amendment interests has fostered a
series of confusing balancing acts that afford viewers and listeners
"paramount rights" in one setting36 and elevate journalistic discretion
in another.37
A government policy that affirms the rights of one, however, need
not necessarily disaffirm the rights of others. Since the Court has ex-
pressed as much concern for the receipt as for the expression of view-
points,3 8 the interests of free-flowing, wide-ranging information ideally
would be served by an affirmative action plan that enhances the first
amendment position of each without detracting from the other. Such a
policy would be not only the least restrictive alternative but, for practi-
cal purposes, a nonrestrictive alternative.
The selection of alternatives for promoting diversity, however, has
been a limited one that has enjoyed only limited success. An assort-
ment of statutes, rules, and policies have been deployed in the cause of
diversity and have traveled different avenues of the mass media with
varying degrees of success and failure. An examination of government
programs designed to promote first amendment values in the media
areas of newspapers, broadcasting, cablecasting, magazines, and books
indicates that the current selection of alternatives designed to promote
diversity is both confusing and nonresponsive to the problems of a con-
centrated communications network.
The enactment of the Newspaper Preservation Act (NPA) rested
upon Congress' express recognition of the public's interest in maintain-
ing a competitive press.39 The Act announced a government strategy
for dealing with the depletion of newspapers as a national information
resource. The NPA provides that two newspapers, under certain cir-
cumstances, may enter into a joint operating agreement to wed their
business operations.40 The conditions for such a marriage are that one
of the publications must be in danger of probable failure41 and that
editorial and reporting functions must be maintained independently.42
If those requirements are met, such a combination is exempted from
antitrust laws.43
35. The first amendment rights of broadcasters, for instance, are subordinate to those of
viewers and listeners. 395 U.S. at 390. But individuals and groups have no general right of access
to broadcast stations or to newspapers. 418 U.S. at 255; 412 U.S. at 121-25.
36. 395 U.S. at 390.
37. 418 U.S. 241; 412 U.S. 94.
38. 395 U.S. at 389.
39. 15 U.S.C. §1801 (1976).
40. Id. §1802(2).
41. Id. §1803.
42. Id. §1802(2).
43. Id. §1803.
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Congress thus attempted to draw a line between a newspaper's busi-
ness and editorial efforts. Such a distinction afforded the means to
prop up a newspaper that otherwise might fold and thus allowed the
preservation of a voice that otherwise might disappear.
The legislative policy of maintaining content diversity without eco-
nomic competition amounts to a genuine preservation act, rather than
an attempt to attract new publishers into the newspaper industry. The
legislation, which protects existing players, actually may have a nega-
tive rather than a neutral effect upon prospective entrants into the field.
The endeavor to preserve the remnants of existing rivalry may effec-
tively discourage new competitors who discover too many disadvan-
tages in competing with the economies of scale and advertising rate-to-
circulation ratio of a publishing combination. 44 Thus the NPA's contri-
bution to first amendment values is one of insuring that conditions for
newspaper diversity will not worsen. But the cost of such maintenance
may be the assurance that those conditions will not improve.
The government's efforts in promoting first amendment values in
broadcasting may be more affirmative than efforts within the newspa-
per media, but these efforts are seldom aggressive. 6 Fairness or access
opportunities arise only upon the airing of controversial views, the de-
livery of a personal attack or the appearance of a political candidate.
The fairness doctrine requires broadcasters to devote a reasonable per-
centage of time to coverage of public issues, which "must be fair in the
sense that it provides an opportunity for the presentation of contrasting
points of view."'47 If the broadcaster makes an on-the-air personal at-
tack upon a group or individual, a right of response is thereby cre-
ated.48 If a legally qualified candidate uses a licensee's broadcasting
facilities, the broadcaster must afford equal opportunities for air time to
opposing candidates.49
Except for the fairness doctrine's requirement that licensees (as pub-
44. A newspaper combination that can deliver morning and evening readership to advertiser
at a lower cost than the sum of the separate rates enjoys a decided economic advantage. The
Supreme Court held that a requirement by a newspaper combination that advertisers purchase
space in both the morning and afternoon papers was not an illegal restraint of trade. Times-
Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 624-26 (1953).
45. Since the NPA's enactment, the number of newspapers in the United States has remained
stable. WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 426 (1978).
46. The FCC, for instance, in 1973 received 2,400 fairness complaints but forwarded only 94
of them to licensees for their comments. In the Matter of the Handling of Public Issues under the
Fairness Doctrine and the Public Interest Standard of the Communications Act, 48 F.C.C.2d 1, 8,
30 R.R.2d 1261 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Fairness Report]. And it was not until 1976 that the
Commission, for the first time, applied the first part of the fairness doctrine which obligates broad-
casters to devote a reasonable percentage of time to coverage of public issues. Rep. Patsy Mink,
59 F.C.C.2d 987, 37 R.R.2d 744 (1976).
47. 48 F.C.C.2d at 7.
48. 47 C.F.R. §73.369 (1977).
49. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §315 (1976).
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lic trustees) cover and balance controversial issues,50 the government's
first amendment promotional activity in broadcasting represents an ef-
fort to encourage a balance of contrasting viewpoints. But since licen-
sees, except for their affirmative duties under the fairness doctrine, are
not required to present controversial ideas, personal attacks or political
broadcasts, such a balance of contrasting viewpoints depends upon an
original appearance or expression that can be balanced or opposed.
Thus, absent initiatives by licensees, the government's first amendment
policies often may promote first amendment values within a vacuum.
The arrival of cable television delivered high expectations of pro-
gramming that could be an alternative to traditional broadcast fare and
that could serve the information needs and interests of specialized
groups. The so far unfulfilled promise of cable is that it will live up to
its capability of serving discrete groups to whom over-the-air broad-
casters cannot afford to cater. The existence of multi-channel cable in
itself is no absolute boon to diversity. Cable systems, which ordinarily
operate under the grant of exclusive franchises, concentrate multiple
channels into the hands of a single cable operator. Such concentration
amidst multiplicity prompted the FCC to impose a public access re-
quirement as one spur to diversity.5 Such a requirement originally
was upheld as "reasonably ancillary" to the Commission's responsibil-
ity to regulate broadcast television. 2 Cable systems with 3,500 or more
subscribers subsequently were ordered to set aside time on one channel
for public access on a first-come, nondiscriminatory basis, 53 and to
lease access to those who were not first in line but who could afford the
price a.5  But the Commission's order5 5 imposing origination and access
requirements upon cablecasters who have "nothing to do with retrans-
mission of broadcast signals on existing channels" has been held to be
beyond the FCC's "reasonably ancillary" jurisdiction.56
The government's effort to open up cablecasting.to the public has
represented a departure from its affirmative first amendment action in
over-the-air broadcasting. Instead of having first amendment interests
hinge upon licensee initiative or the appearance of a controversial view
or a political candidate, the FCC's cable policy carved out a public
right to speak out without the precondition of a preceding statement.
Since the Commission barred cable operators from exercising control
50. Fairness Report, supra note 46, at 7.
51. 47 C.F.R. §76.254 (1977).
52. United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649 (1972), rehearing denied, 409 U.S.
898 (1972).
53. 47 C.F.R. §76.254 (1977).
54. Id.
55. Report and Order in Docket N. 20508, 59 F.C.C.2d 294 (1976).
56. Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025, 1052 (8th Cir. 1978) (app. pending).
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over the content of access programming,57 entry into cable's market-
place of ideas under such a policy would be controlled primarily by
time, small money requirements, and the public's motivation. How-
ever, if the Commission lacks the power to oversee programming
originating in the studios of cablecasters,58 efforts to undertake affirma-
tive action within the existing cable structure will be met by the same
barrier that so far has blocked access to newspapers. A final analysis 9
of cable systems on the same plateau as newspapers,60 therefore, would
protect the private editorial process in cablecasting precisely as it has
been protected in newspapers.'
The government, which has adopted a highly visible role as a regula-
tor and promoter of first amendment values in broadcasting, has main-
tained a lower profile in the fields of magazine and book publishing.
The government's contribution to, and the main stimulation for, the
growth of the magazine industry through most of the 20th century were
low cost postage rates.62 Government's affirmative action to subsidize
indirectly the distribution of magazines has been regarded as one of the
most significant contributions to the first amendment interest in diver-
sity.63 The resounding success in promoting the first amendment in this
area, however, did not deter Congress from backing away and deciding
that mail must pay its own way under an independent postal service.64
The creation of an independent postal service with a philosophy that
each mailing must pay its way led to a substantial boost in second class
rates,65 the disappearance of some magazines, 66 and the end of a first
amendment subsidy.
The new postage costs for magazines, that triggered an increase in
magazine prices, left readers with a new cost-benefit decision in choos-
ing their sources of information. Magazines, which must compete with
other information outlets in a mass media society, were placed at a
further disadvantage in competing with the electronic forum. Televi-
sion and radio generally can increase their audience without additional
57. 47 C.F.R. §76.255(b) (1977). Cable operators, however, are required to assure no adver-
tising, lottery information, or obscene material is aired. -d. §76.255(d)(1).
58. Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 28-29 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
988 (1977).
59. An appeal of Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC is pending in the Supreme Court.
60. 571 F.2d at 1056.
61. Id.; Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).
62. T. PETERSON, MAGAZINES IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 1 (1964).
63. Ablard and Harris, The Post Office and the Publishers'Pursestrings: A Study of the Second
Class Mailing Permit, 30 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 567, 601 (1962).
64. 39 U.S.C. §3622(2) (1976). The government still could subsidize magazines by adding
such a basis for appropriations under 39 U.S.C. §2401 (1976).
65. Media and the First Amendment, supra note 7, at 927.
66. Id. at 928. Cowles Communications, Inc. blamed the new postal rates for forcing Look
magazine out of business. TIME, Sept. 27, 1971, at 55.
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cost. But a magazine, in enlarging its readership, must bear additional
costs of printing, paper, and postage that may not be offset by addi-
tional advertising.67
The government, therefore, which has been busy promoting first
amendment values in broadcasting and newspapers, has been thwart-
ing those same interests in the magazine business. Such conflicting re-
sults demonstrate lack of a coherent first amendment affirmative action
policy. These conflicting programs graphically illustrate the considera-
ble influence of positive or negative action by the government in the
first amendment domain.
The mixture of promotional policies and mixed results of affirmative
first amendment efforts seem to have had the least concern for (and
thus the least impact upon) the publication of books. The book pub-
lishing industry generally has displayed an inherent tendency toward
diversity and thus has been the least urgent candidate for affirmative
action. Controversial ideas have fared relatively well in the book pub-
lishing field, which has proven to be more amenable to smaller audi-
ences, specialized topics, and controversy.68 Since books are supported
by individual purchasers, the danger of content influence or control by
advertisers is eliminated.69 The fear of an advertiser's reaction to a
controversial or unpopular idea, by contrast, has been blamed for
bland television programming7° and toned-down or nonexistent news-
paper coverage.7'
The comparative health of diversity in the book publishing industry
is spelled out in figures that show several hundred book publishers in
operation, "none of which achieves more than five percent of the total
market, [with a] number of new firms open[ing] each year."72 Unlike
the newspaper business, book publishers ordinarily do not own a physi-
cal production plant. So entry into the book publishing field is facili-
tated by lower capital requirements.
Book publishing, however, is not immune to the type of concentra-
tion and cross-ownership that characterizes newspaper and magazine
publishing and broadcasting. 73 Such consolidation of previously dispa-
rate information outlets occurred with the acquisition of Pantheon
67. Media and the First Amendment, supra note 7, at 931.
68. Id. at 919.
69. Id.
70. CBS v. Democratic Natl Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 187-89 (1973).
71. McDonald, The Media's Conflict of Interests, THE CENTER MAGAZINE, Nov.-DeC. 1976,
at 19-20.
72. Media and the First Amendment, supra note 7, at 920.
73. A model of concentration and cross-ownership has been established by the Post-News-
week Company, which owns one of the three national news magazines, the morning newspaper in
Washington, D. C. and television or radio stations in Michigan, Connecticut, Florida, and Wash-
ington, D. C., BROADCASTING YEARBOOK 201 (1977).
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Books by Knopf, a subsequent merger between Knopf and Random
House, and an eventual acquisition by RCA.74
A trend toward heightened concentration in the book publishing in-
dustry could lead to less risk-taking with, and fewer chances for, con-
troversial ideas.75 Fewer outlets would mean fewer publishing
opportunities for those who want to publish. The only consolation with
such a reality would be that a "troublesome" figure,76 whose manu-
script was rejected by 30 publishers, would not have to make as many
as 30 wasted trips.
Thus, existing government efforts in promoting first amendment
goals, except in the area of books where none are needed, are inade-
quate to promote diversity in the changing economic and social envi-
ronment of mass media. Having examined governmental attempts to
promote diversity of opinion under the first amendment and the obsta-
cles that stand in the way of that promotion, this article will now dis-
cuss the feasibility of expanding present programs in order to more
affirmatively promote first amendment aims.
THE CALL FOR ACTION THAT IS MORE AFFIRMATIVE: PROBLEMS
WITH EXPANDING EXISTING PROGRAMS
A belief that ongoing efforts to promote diversity of expression do
not go far enough has stirred an appeal for more effective affirmative
action policies. The most common battlecries on behalf of such pro-
posals call for extension of the fairness and right to reply concepts to
newspapers and enlargement of the right of access to radio and televi-
sion. Such aims are the objectives of a strategy that presumes diversity
can be achieved and maintained within the existing concentrated media
framework. In order to evaluate the effectiveness of affirmative action
programs based on expansion of the "fairness" and "right to access"
doctrines, these existing programs will be analyzed in terms of the
probability of judicial acceptance of expansion, their practicality, and
their constitutionality.
A. Judicial Considerations
The goal of securing a public right of access to newspapers probably
has yielded the least return, and encountered the most judicial resist-
74. Dempsey, Publishing's Agonizing Reappraisal, THE NEw REPUBLIC, May 14, 1966, at 23,
25.
75. Media and the First Amendment, supra note 7, at 920.
76. Abbie Hoffman eventually formed his own book company to publish Steal This Book.
Although he could not find an established book company to publish it, the ease with which he
published it himself comments favorably upon the ease of entering the book publishing field. Id.
at 917.
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ance, among existing endeavors to "open up" the media. The Supreme
Court, in upholding the sanctity of a publisher's editorial judgment,
noted that the growing concentration and scarcity of newspapers pose
a threat to the public interest in diversity of information and opinion.
7 7
But although the Court's support for journalistic discretion may have
put many publishers at ease, the Court's decision has not put the argu-
ment for public access to rest. Instead, the case is still being made for a
newspaper fairness doctrine that would require equal space for oppos-
ing sides of controversial issues and a right to respond to personal at-
tacks.78
Although the Court has rejected such a fairness proposal, 79 the me-
dia concentration it alluded to still lingers. So long as the Court is
willing to justify fiduciary obligations for broadcasters because of scar-
city of frequencies, 0 it will unwittingly continue to breathe life into the
argument that the scarcity of newspapers warrants the same duties for
publishers.
If Congress were to build upon the same scarcity rationale that is
used for broadcasting, it seemingly could establish a fiduciary standard
at least for those newspapers that are exempt from antitrust laws. The
basis of such an obligation for publishers might be equated with the
duty of public interest broadcasting that is imposed with the grant of a
license.8 ' The "grant" of an exemption from antitrust laws similarly
could be predicated upon a legislated quidpro quo of public interest
publishing. The federal government, under its commerce power,82
would be authorized to monitor complaints and compel newspapers to
provide balancing space when warranted.
For now, however, advocates for such access can only talk about the
merits of their idea rather than do anything about it. The Court's last
word has manifested an underlying fear of such change because "[i]t
has yet to be demonstrated how governmental regulation of this crucial
process can be exercised consistent with first amendment guarantees of
a free press as they have evolved to this time."' 83 Therefore, although
the Court has offered a tempting rationale for access by acknowledging
77. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 250 n.15 (1974).
78. T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 627 (1970); Comment, New
Challenges to Newspaper Freedom of the Press-7he Struggle for Right of Access and Attacks on
Cross-Media Ownership, 24 DE PAUL L. REV. 165, 178 (1974); McDonald, The Media's Conflict of
Interests, THE CENTER MAGAZINE, Nov.-Dec. 1976, at 24-25.
79. 418 U.S. at 258.
80. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388-89 (1969).
81. Id. at 389.
82. The United States Constitution, Article I, Section 8 provides that "The Congress shall
have power to regulate commerce among the several states. See. also Wickard, v. Filburn,
317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942).
83. 418 U.S. at 258.
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the reality and danger of concentration in the marketplace of ideas,8 4 it
has not yet persuaded itself that the proposed cure is better than the
ailment.8 5
Even the most meager right of public access in broadcasting is more
access than is available to newspapers. Some access to radio and televi-
sion already exists in the form of fairness, personal attack, and political
candidacy provisions.8 6 But those access rights offer the only access
opportunities presently available in the electronic forum. The argu-
ment for broader access rights rests upon the belief that fairness and
balancing concepts generally are more harmful than helpful. Fairness
imposes an affirmative duty to raise controversial issues, but licensees
may be overly sensitive to the possibility of advertiser distaste for con-
troversy. Enforcement requires the FCC either to play an intrusive role
in determining program content or to lay back and adopt a less influen-
tial posture of deference to licensee discretion.
A general right of public access, by contrast, would supply diversity
and controversy by drawing upon competing voices and viewpoints
within the community. The government's role could be diminished
from determining what types of programming were necessary for im-
plementation of fair programming to a role of simply issuing a stan-
dard for required access time and making certain that licensees set
aside the minimum amount.
An effort to broaden the rights of, opportunities for, and access to
fair programming was turned back by the Supreme Court, which held
that licensees are not obligated to sell time for editorial advertise-
ments.8 7 The Court, in making that decision, concluded that the pub-
lie's right to be informed already was protected adequately by the
fairness doctrine.88 So although the Court was willing to keep the door
open for a limited form of access, it reaffirmed that the licensee was the
doorman who could keep the public outside.8 9
The Court, in holding the line on access, did not dash all hopes for
an expanded right of access in the future. It in fact refused to foreclose
all possibilities for access and suggested that "at some future date Con-
gress or the Commission-or the broadcasters-may devise some kind
84. Id. at 249-50.
85. Id. at 248-59.
86. See notes 47-49 and accompanying text supra.
87. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 121-32 (1973).
88. The Court noted that Congress and its chosen regulatory agency had established a "deli-
cately balanced system of regulation intended to serve the interests of all concerned" and that it
would afford "great weight" to the Commission's experience and decisions. Id. at 102-03. Justice
Brennan, in his dissent, criticized the Court for relying upon the fairness doctrine "as the sole
means of informing the public." Id. at 188-89.
89. Id. at 130-31.
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of limited access that is both practicable and desirable."9 Although
the Court and the Commission have emphasized the importance of li-
censee discretion in editorial decisionmaking,9' broadcasting remains a
field in which access inroads have been made. Greater access, how-
ever, depends upon greater willingness of the Court to find any propo-
sal "practicable" and "desirable." 92
B. Practical Considerations
The existing avenues of fairness and access in broadcasting (and as
proposed for newspapers) have been paved to balance the competing
first amendment interests of suppliers and receivers of information.
The statutory right of access for opposing political candidates and the
personal attack rule afford only a limited form of access in limited cir-
cumstances. And although fairness is a more frequent subject of atten-
tion, it is almost as frequently dismissed as it is considered.9
The futility of fairness stems from the fact that it must be enforced
either by the broadcaster (or publisher, if applied to newspapers) or by
the government. If fairness is left to editorial discretion, no guarantee
exists that balanced programming will follow. But if government vig-
orously enforces fairness the danger of government interference with
and control of program content arises.
The record of fairness in broadcasting offers little to commend its
continuation and even less to commend its extension to newspapers.
The FCC, in attempting to juggle the need for diversity and for govern-
mental restraint, has adopted broad guidelines which in turn afford
licensees broad discretion in serving the cause of fairness.94
A licensee who airs an editorial advertisement, 95 for instance, need
"do nothing more than to make a reasonable, common-sense judgment
as to whether the advertisement presents a meaningful statement which
obviously addresses and advocates a point of view on a controversial
issue of public importance."9 6 The only ground for a successful chal-
lenge of a licensee decision would be "if that relationship could be
90. Id. at 131.
91. Id. at 120-21; Reconsideration of the Fairness Report, 58 F.C.C.2d 691, 36 R.R.2d 1921
(1976).
92. A proposal now under FCC consideration would give licensees a choice between furnish-
ing one hour per week of public access time or remaining subject to the fairness doctrine. Com-
ments of Committee for Open Media, BC Docket No. 78-60 (FCC, ified Sept. 6, 1978).
93. Fairness Report, supra note 46, at 8.
94. Id.
95. The FCC considers an editorial advertisement to be a commercial that presents a "mean-
ingful statement which obviously addresses, and advocates, a point of view on a controversial
issue of public importance." Id. at 23.
96. Id.
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shown to be substantial and obvious. 97
Such deference to licensee discretion, at least in part, appears respon-
sive to the fact that standards such as "meaningful statement," "sub-
stantial and obvious relationship," and "controversial issue of public
importance" are criteria that, when applied, could lead different per-
sons to different conclusions on the same set of facts. Nevertheless, a
consequence of that approach is that if the Commission errs in deciding
a complaint, it more likely will err on the side of the licensee rather
than on the side of balanced programming.
Although the FCC has been inclined to defer to licensees' "reason-
able, common sense judgments,"9" such a tack is not without its bene-
fits. A more activist role in enforcing fairness would inject the
Commission more deeply into a station's programming decisions in de-
termining what broadcasts required balance. If it can be assumed that
many fairness decisions may be close calls anyway, it is arguable that
the difficulty of making such judgments, coupled with the hazard of
government intrusion into program content, represents a danger that
should be avoided and often is avoided by a habit of agency deference.
The FCC's announced position, however, that "what we are really
concerned with is an obvious participation in public debate," 99 sets
forth an agency-approved formula for any message-maker interested in
avoiding the fairness doctrine. If an issue is incorporated subtly into a
spot or program and not discussed explicitly, different viewers are
likely to have different opinions about how "obvious" the participation
is "in public debate." The Commission's position, therefore, of limiting
its attention to "obvious participation" is a valuable guide to licensees
and advertisers who may want to shape political and economic
messages in a way that forecloses the chances of having the "other
side's" position aired.
An example of a message that probably would escape fairness obli-
gations might be an oil company's spot encouraging consumers to con-
serve energy, while the company endeavors to develop alternative
energy sources.100 Even if the sponsor's actual intent was to communi-
cate the desirability of having oil companies develop and control other
energy sources (thus presenting a controversial issue of public impor-
tance), a licensee reasonably could claim that the spot only addressed
the need for alternative energy sources. The licensee's interpretation,
97. Id. at 24.
98. Id. at 23.
99. Id.
100. Exxon Corporation advertisement aired on NBC Sunday Evening News, October 30,
1978.
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therefore, would be that the message did not "meaningfully and obvi-
ously relate to a controversial issue of public importance." The result
would be that the company not only delivered its message, but also that
its technique probably erected effective barriers against the entry of
competing viewpoints.
The lesson for advertisers and broadcasters, in a world of deference
to licensee discretion, would appear to be that it matters not so much
what is said as how it is said. And whether or not such messages con-
tribute to the formation of opinions or simply reinforce existing atti-
tudes, either of those effects translates into an impact upon public
opinion. If that opinion is supposed to be the product of a reasonably
broad-based and balanced debate, it would appear that the fairness
doctrine fails to serve as a forceful ally in the struggle for diversity.
Since the fairness doctrine can be so easily circumvented, the ques-
tion that cannot be easily avoided is why it should continue to exist.
Although fairness may have its failings, good intentions is not necessar-
ily one of them. The fairness doctrine essentially is the product of a
balancing act in which the licensee's interest in broadcasting what he
wants has been weighed against the viewer-listener's right in receiving
the information he needs. 10'
The objectives of the fairness doctrine largely have been sacrificed
upon the altar of deference to licensee discretion. But even (and per-
haps especially) if fairness were enforced vigorously, the trade-off for
increased vigilance would be a higher-profile presence of government
perched over editorial shoulders. Since the remedies for a fairness vio-
lation are wide-ranging, the Commission is armed with powerful weap-
ons to shape program content if it chooses to use them."10
Fears of government manipulation of the regulatory apparatus to in-
fluence program content have proved not to be misplaced, given certain
practices that occurred during the Nixon administration. Speeches,
statements, and memos that hinted at sanctions against broadcasters
erased any doubt that the government possesses considerable leverage
to intimidate.10 3
101. Fairness Report, supra note 46, at 2-6.
102. The FCC is empowered to revoke a station's license, issue a short-term renewal, impose a
forfeiture, or request that the licensee provide time for a contrasting view. 47 U.S.C. §§307(d),
312(b), 503(b) (1976).
103. The possibility of intimidating broadcasters through the licensing process seems to have
been especially well recognized by the Nixon administration. White House Office of Telecommu-
nications Policy Director Clay Whitehead, in a speech to Sigma Delta Chi in 1972, warned that
stations which did not correct "network inbalance" or bias might find themselves in trouble at
renewal time. THE POLrICs OF BROADCASTING 228-34 (M. Barrett, ed., 1973). A tape recording
revealed that President Nixon discussed the possibility of "retaliating" against the Washington
Post via its broadcast licenses. New York Times, May 16, 1974, at 1.
A memo from presidential aide Charles Colson to H. R. Haldeman stated that: "I will pursjle
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A reduced threat of government-shaped programming may be one
consolation for the FCC's less than vigorous pursuit of fairness. But
the discovery of merit in a feeble enforcement effort serves only to
render more suspect the value of the fairness doctrine itself. So long as
fairness is the guiding light, it never can be truly effective unless en-
forced more energetically-but always will be subject to abuse by a
government that chooses a course of exploitation. The net result for the
public and for diversity, therefore, would seem to be a protective device
that affords little protection but creates a lingering danger of misuse.
C Constitutional Considerations
The practical shortcomings of fairness and access are at least equal-
led by their constitutional deficiencies. The government, in promoting
first amendment values by means of fairness and access, is by the same
means imposing upon a broadcaster's or publisher's first amendment
rights of self-expression.
The Supreme Court's conclusion, that a state right of reply statute
for newspapers was a form of compulsion that violated the first amend-
ment,104 is consistent with a literal reading of the first amendment guar-
antee that government shall not abridge freedom of the press. The
state law had made no reservations about regulating the content of
newspapers, and the Court had no reservations about opposing any re-
striction compelling newspapers to publish "that which reason tells
them should not be published."'1 5
An earlier claim by broadcasters, however, that the first amendment
also protects their desire to use their allocated frequencies to broadcast
whatever they choose and to exclude whomever they choose,10 6 failed
to pass muster with the Court. Instead, the Court advised licensees that
their rights of self-expression were secondary to the "paramount rights"
of viewers and listeners to receive diverse information. 07
The Court decisions that afford different degrees of first amendment
protection to different types of media operators'08 inevitably create gra-
dations of first amendment protection for self-expression within the
with Dean Burch (then FCC Chairman) the possibility of an interpretive ruling by the FCC ... I
think this point can be very favorably clarified and it would, of course, have an inhibiting effect on
the networks. . . I think we can dampen their ardor. Washington Post, Dec. 3, 1973, §A at
24.
104. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).
105. Id. at 254-56.
106. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969).
107. Id. at 390.
108. The Court has held that "[d]ifferences in the characteristics of news media justify differ-
ences in First Amendment standards applied to them." Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395
U.S. 367, 386 (1969). Compare 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
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media. The effort to justify lower-grade rights of self-expression for
broadcasters rests upon the conclusion that frequencies are scarce and
that part of the price of a license is the obligation to perform as a fiduci-
ary.10
9
Such a rationale, even if it creates a better balance of expression,
perpetuates the myth that special circumstances of scarcity that de-
mand regulation in broadcasting do not exist in the newspaper busi-
ness. Since newspapers are in fact more of a rarity than broadcasting
outlets in many cities, the scarcity rationale would seem to argue even
more urgently for fairness in and access to newspapers. Even if govern-
ment regulation is justified because of extensive government involve-
ment in creating and preserving order in the electronic media,'10 it
would seem to be as easily warranted by government's prominent role
in legislating to keep much of the newspaper industry alive.'
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that access (and arguably
fairness) erodes the right of self-expression by increasing the cost of
expression and confiscating the time or space that could have been de-
voted to self-expression.' 2 Such realities are equally restrictive for
broadcasters and for publishers, whose choice of material and decisions
of content, treatment, and exposure "constitute the exercise of editorial
control and judgments."'1 3 Ultimately, therefore, "every encroach-
ment by government, no matter how narrowly circumscribed, will inev-
itably effect the 'content.' ,114
If affirmative action within the existing mass media structure is a
cause of action worthy of being pursued, it deserves a constitutional
rationale that is convincing rather than contrived and that rests upon
reality rather than myth. Until a compelling and consistent reason for
such action becomes the foundation for consequent legal decisionmak-
ing, the government quite simply would seem to be engaged in the
business of abridging freedom of the press with a less than satisfactory
basis for so doing.
Even if fairness and access did not erode some rights of self-expres-
sion, their failure so far to serve the- interests of diversity effectively
argue for their recall and replacement. Since those balancing devices
make minimal contributions to diversity and intrude upon some forms
109. 395 U.S. at 389-90.
110. Id. at 393-95.
111. The Supreme Court has acknowledged the Newspaper Presesrvation Act's special sup-
port but did not discuss the possibility of a parallel to government involvement in broadcasting.
418 U.S. at 251 n.16.
112. Id. at 256-57.
113. Id. at 258.
114. Chatzky and Robinson, A Constitutional Right of Access to Newspapers: Is There LJfe
after Tornillo?, 16 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 453, 480 (1976).
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of expression, the only trade-off is that first amendment values are
benefitted insubstantially at the cost of burdening first amendment
rights. The need to strike a balance among competing first amendment
interests insures unending bickering among those interests in search of
new balances. Even a juggling act that promoted "equal liberty of ex-
pression" for publishers and readers and for broadcasters and viewer-
listeners,"I5 still would have problems and must be reconciled with the
explicit proscription against abridging freedom of the press.
The methodology of fairness and access has been to parcel out bits of
rights to some by chipping away at the rights of others and leaving no
one constitutionally intact. The effort to justify such a redistribution
has rested upon inconsistent and shifting sands of reasoning and has
reflected a strategy of working within the existing system to make it
more responsive to first amendment values. But the limited returns
from first amendment investments in a system that has not yielded to
diversity suggests the need to expand or look beyond that system.
Given the difficulties of justification and goal-realization within the
prevailing system, it would appear that affirmative action is the right
tune being played on the wrong instrument.
ALTERNATIVES FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
The government, in attempting to promote diversity, has two general
options from which to choose. It may endeavor to diversify program-
ming by regulation that leads to content determinations and to oppor-
tunities for access within the system or by creating or encouraging new
additions to the system.
Efforts to create diversity within a centralized media structure have
followed a narrow and well-worn path. Progress along that route, how-
ever, has fallen considerably short of its destination and has encoun-
tered serious first amendment obstacles. The intellectual chaos that is
the fall-out from selective line-drawing and convoluted reasoning,
however, might have been averted altogether if the government had
opted for a more forceful policy of media expansion rather than media
oversight.
The justifications for attacking media concentration upon economic
grounds, and for encouraging structural diversity, generally are more
accessible and more acceptable than those used to regulate content.
The Supreme Court, in addressing the problem of restraint of trade in
the mass media, upheld the validity of regulation that was aimed at
115. Karst, Equali y as a Central Princ4le in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 20
(1975).
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controlling the hazards of concentration. 16 The Court, in recognizing
the need for antitrust regulation, supplied the springboard for eco-
nomic regulation by noting that "[flreedom of the press from govern-
mental interference does not sanction repression of that freedom by
private interests."' 1 7 It would seem sufficient for the purposes of eco-
nomic policymaking, therefore, that repression need not be caused
solely by antitrust practices so long as it is a dangerous by-product of a
concentrated media industry.
Regulation of the media on economic grounds has been at least as
inconsistent in application and results as regulation on content-related
grounds. Economic regulation in the newspaper industry represents an
effort to live with concentration rather than to overcome it. Any at-
tempt to hold back the tide of concentration was swept away by the
Newspaper Preservation Act. The Act, which was designed to prevent
further shrinkage of print space, protects established newspapers that
otherwise might fail. The preferred treatment dispensed in the form of
antitrust exemptions reflects a belief that some concentration is neces-
sary to preserve diversity. 8
The FCC, by contrast, has undertaken economic regulation aimed at
promoting multiplicity rather than protecting concentration. The
Commission has assembled its set of anticoncentration policies under
the mantle of its authority to regulate in the "public interest." '119 Such
regulations include proscriptions against certain exclusive dealing prac-
tices between networks and affiliated stations,' 20 multiple ownership
rules limiting the total number of stations a single or common owner
may hold, 12' and restrictions upon cross-ownership.
The Commission also pursues a policy of promoting diversification
among licensees when it evaluates applicants in comparative hearings.
The validity and the merit for diversity has been acknowledged by a
court which held that "[p]lainly the Commission does not exceed its
116. "The First Amendment affords not the slightest support for the contention that a combi-
nation to restrain trade in news and views has any constitutional immuity." Associated Press v.
United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
117. Mansfield Journal Co. v. FCC, 180 F.2d 28, 33 (D.C. Cir. 1950). The FCC, in refusing to
grant a license that might have adversely affected diversity, was upheld for reasons that have
implications for a concentrated media industry as a whole. The agency was supported by a court
holding that "monopoly in the mass communications of news and advertising is contrary to the
public interest even if not in terms proscribed by the antitrust laws." Id.
118. See H.R. REP. No. 91-1193, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reportedin [1970] 2 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 3547.
119. 47 U.S.C. § 309 (1976); Robinson, The FCC andthe First Amendment: Observations on 40
Years of Radio and Televison Regulation, 52 MNN. L. REv. 67, 73 (1967).
120. FCC, Report on Chain Broadcasting (1943), a}7'd, NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190
(1943).
121. Multiple Ownership, 50 F.C.C.2d 1046,32 R.R.2d 954 (1975), aj'd in part, vacatedinpart
sub nom. National Citizens' Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 555 F.2d 938 (1977), aj'd in part,
rev'd in part, FCC v. National Citizens' Comm. for Broadcasting, 98 S. Ct. 2096 (1978).
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powers in seeking to avoid rather than foster a concentration of control
of the sources of news and opinion."'' 22 The court thus endorsed the
agency's affirmative endeavor "in the public interest to certify as licen-
sees those who would most naturally initiate, encourage and expand
diversity of approach and viewpoint."12 3
Although the Commission's willingness to award a plus for diversity
reflects positive intentions, the outcome of license hearings do not nec-
essarily amount to a victory for diversification. Any plus that a licensee
receives for his potential contribution to diversification ordinarily is
available only in a comparative proceeding. 2 4 The effect of such a
merit may be diluted and outweighed by such licensing considerations
as area familiarity, integration of ownership with management, broad-
cast experience, preparation and planning, past broadcast experience,
and financial resources. 25 The weighing of such considerations as an
applicant's broadcasting record, experience, and wealth, in fact, often
may assure that for each point an applicant loses on concentration he
may win three others. So even such a policy designed to reward diver-
sity may be thwarted by associated policies that operate to stack the
odds against diversity.
The failure to halt the trend toward concentration and to safeguard
diversity from within the existing system argues for the expansion of or
addition to the system or the creation of competing systems. Such ex-
pansion and construction projects could be undertaken in the form of
government subsidization of new media outlets, government creation
of its own media facilities, or the encouragement of new communica-
tions technologies. Affirmative action in any of those directions ideally
would permit government to leave the business of overseeing a system
that defies diversity and to concentrate upon creating new opportunities
for diversity.
A. Subsidizing the First Amendment
Subsidization is one affirmative action alternative that emphasizes
government assistance over government interference. A practical les-
son in subsidizing first amendment values may be learned from other
countries that have adopted such affirmative measures to promote di-
versity of expression in their media. Sweden, for instance, funnels $40
million in direct subsidies and an equal amount in indirect subsidies to
122. Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
403 U.S. 923 (1971).
123. Id. at 86.
124. A rare exception is Laurence A. Harvey, 13 F.C.C. 23, 99 R.R. 378 (1948), ajfdsub nom.
Mansfield Journal Co. v. FCC, 180 F.2d 28 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
125. See Grand Broadcasting Co., 36 F.C.C. 925, 2 R.R.2d 327 (1964).
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keep newspapers economically healthy.126 The willingness to make
such investments in first amendment-type values has paid off to the
extent of halting a trend of newspaper failings. The number of newspa-
pers in Sweden had dwindled from 234 in 1920, to 207 in 1948, to 144
in 1960, and to 116 in 1970.127 During the five years after the Swedish
government initiated its subsidization program, however, only one
newspaper collapsed.'28
Such a subsidization effort seems to have had essentially the same
impact in Sweden that the Newspaper Preservation Act has had in the
United States. Although both efforts have protected the vestiges of di-
versity, neither has succeeded in attracting new voices. The Swedish
experience with subsidization, therefore, would seem to demonstrate
that unless a society is willing to pay for creation of new outlets, rather
than just for the protection of existing ones, it can only prevent further
deterioration of the conditions for diversity.
The federal government cleared one path for the subsidization of di-
versity by enacting the Public Broadcasting Act.'29 That legislation
created an alternative to standard commercial broadcast fare by setting
up the privately-incorporated Corporation for Public Broadcasting
(CPB), 3 ° which in turn spawned the Public Broadcasting Service
(PBS) as the network and production arm of public television.'
Public television is a congressional creation that theoretically was
designed to be free of federal government interference. But public tele-
vision's dependence upon federal funding leaves it subject to govern-
mental pressure and interference. 32 The danger of government
intrusion that lurks in government funding already has been put on
display. CPB, in 1973, reacted to criticism from Congress and the
Nixon administration by moving to wrest program decisionmaking
from PBS. 33 CPB, in proposing the termination of several programs
that it considered too controversial, demonstrated that the interests of
diversity can be as easily sacrificed by pressure from a government con-
centration of power as from a private one. Although a compromise was
reached between CPB and PBS, whereby "[q]uestions of 'balance' and
'objectivity' would be resolved by a monitoring committee of' CPB
126. Indirect subsidies include tax exemptions and reductions, lower postal rates, and a loan
fund. Campbell, Free Press In Sweden andAmerica: Who's the Fairest of Them Ai?, 8 Sw. U. L.
REv. 61, 63-64 (1974).
127. Id. at 63.
128. Id.
129. 47 U.S.C. §§390-399 (1976).
130. Id. §396(b).
131. Media and the First Amendment, supra note 7, at 1022.
132. Hearings on H.R. 6736 and S. 1160 before the House Committee on Interstate and For-
eign Commerce, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 31-33 (1967).
133. New York Times, Jan. 12, 1973, at 66, col. 4.
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and PBS representatives,1 34 the Achilles heel of public television in its
present form was graphically portrayed.
An alternative to federal funding, that would provide steady and de-
pendable revenue for public television, would be to establish a trust
fund consisting of grants from private sources and an excise tax on the
sale of television sets. 135 If the government is to become truly serious
about promoting first amendment values without inhibiting the flow
and influencing the content of information, it should begin by affording
public television such an improved funding mechanism or other means
of support that is safe and secure.
B. The Government Broadcasting Network
An even more direct form of government participation than direct
aid would be government operation of a media network. The federal
government, despite having no domestic media outlet,136 probably has
some of the most extensive media experience. The government has a
well-established background in creating and operating such informa-
tion facilities as art galleries, libraries, and schools. 137 The government
has picked up professional broadcasting experience through its opera-
tion of the Voice of America. And the federal government has become
the nation's most prolific filmmaker, radio and television producer, and
pamphleteer. 138
If a government-operated domestic print or broadcast outlet were
created to serve diversity, it would be subject to the same purse string
pressures that subvert such interests in public television. Such potential
dangers would argue for a trust fund type of financing, which was re-
jected by Congress for public television, and for authority to be vested
in a board of directors with a diverse enough composition to immunize
it from political pressure as much as possible.
If the federal government operated a broadcasting network, its media
facilities might be a more reachable target for the access arguments that
have failed with the existing media. Justice Stewart, speaking for him-
self, has contended that the first amendment confers no "protection on
the Government."' 139 And he has argued that a finding of goverumen-
134. Canby, Jr., The First .mendment and the State as Editor" Implicationsfor Public Broad
casting, 52 TEx. L. REv. 1123, 1158 (1974).
135. Such a proposal was made by a Carnegie Commission report but rejected by Congress.
Media and the First 4mendment, supra note 7, at 1023.
136. The government-operated Voice of America is barred from broadcasting domestically.
22 U.S.C. §1461 (1976).
137. Canby, Jr., The First Amendment and the State as Editor: l1mplicationsfor Public Broad-
casting, 52 Tax. L. REv. 1123, 1129 (1974).
138. Government II, Uncle Sam's Angels, TIME, May 8, 1978, at 29.
139. CBS v. Democratic Natl Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 139 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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tal action would obligate the state "to grant the demands of all citizens
to be heard over the air, subject only to reasonable regulations as to
time, place and manner."' 40 Such a finding, in effect, would transform
a government media operation into a public forum and leave the state
with the task of policing traffic.'41
The Stewart analysis, however, is not necessarily the final one. An
argument could prevail that the state, when editorializing, is engaged in
a government function and thus that the state could deny public ac-
cess. 142 If government control and operation of media facilities were
found to be essential to the success of affirmative first amendment ac-
tion and preservation of first amendment values, the government might
have as compelling a reason for denying or limiting public access as it
does for certain other government facilities. 143
The Supreme Court passed up the opportunity to reach such a con-
clusion when it refused to hear the appeal of a would-be author whose
article was rejected by a state university's law review. 44 The appeals
court ruling thus stood, and a state engaged in an editorial function was
permitted to deny access. 141
Even if the government could deny public access, it would not serve
the interest of diversity to deny such access altogether. Rather, first
amendment values would be enhanced by access provisions that af-
forded an outlet for new viewpoints and voices. Although the govern-
ment probably would be faced with the problem of more speakers than
speaking time, it could permit access on a nondiscriminatory first-in-
line or representative spokesperson basis. 46 Such a system that re-
sponded to appeals for access would, in so doing, be responsive to the
needs of diversity.
An affirmative government role as broadcaster (or as publisher)
could have a positive effect upon first amendment values and interests.
But a potentially troublesome consideration is whether a contribution
to diversity would be adequate compensation if government used its
power to distort information and to lie. The example of the French
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
143. The Court, in rejecting public forum arguments, has upheld government authority to
deny access to jails, courthouses, and military bases. 1d.; Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976); Cox
v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965).
144. A federal appellate court concluded that the exercise of editorial judgment was a compel-
ling enough reason to deny any general right of access and to prevent transforming such a state
publication into a public forum. Avins v. Rutgers, State Univ. of N.J., 385 F.2d 151, 153-54 (3d
Cir. 1967), ceri. denied, 390 U.S. 920 (1968).
145. Id.
146. Comments of Committee for Open Media, BC Docket No. 78-60 (FCC, filed Sept. 6,
1978).
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government-owned media provides fuel for such fears, given its per-
formance as a state propaganda tool during major national crises over
Suez and Algeria and during the 1968 riots.' 47 And since the American
government at times has undertaken to manipulate or intimidate a me-
dia it does not even own, 148 the prospects for self-restraint on its own
outlet would seem remote.
But such fears of information management and manipulation by the
government would be justified if the government were the only source
of information 149 or the dominant source thereof. Even without its own
media outlet, the federal government has displayed considerable dex-
terity in producing, packaging, and orchestrating information cam-
paigns that flow through the media to the public.' 50 But if government
broadcasting enjoyed a secure funding mechanism, and if its directors
were diverse enough and far enough removed to be insulated from po-
litical pressures, the government's own media would not be subject to
significantly more manipulation than the existing media. In fact, crea-
tion of access time would be an additional check on government that
does not exist elsewhere. An equally significant counterbalance to the
influence of a government-operated system would emerge if govern-
ment's role was limited to competing with rather than overseeing pri-
vate media programming.
If government, which already uses the private media for releasing
information, operated its own outlet, its presence would enlarge the
contours of the media forum but would not necessarily dominate it.
The government's emergence as a media operator alongside private op-
erators simply would reflect the reality that
[t]he forum is not something we have before government takes a
hand and which is "free" until government intrudes. It is a system in
which government is a constitutive element. To say that government
should, in the name of free speech, leave the forum alone is like say-
ing that government should, in the name of justice have nothing to
do with courts.151
The logic of such a perspective, however, does not obscure or dimin-
ish the fact that one of the ever-present realities of a strong central
government is its capacity to abuse its own or someone else's communi-
cations system. Concern about government participation in the first
amendment-sensitive area of speech and press might reflect an aware-
147. Media and the First Amendment, supra note 7, at 1031.
148. NEWSWEEK, Nov. 24, 1969, at 88-92.
149. Even if government enjoyed a monopoly ownership of the media, a strong argument
could be made for public access. Bonner-Lyons v. School Comm., 480 F.2d 442 (Ist Cir. 1973).
150. Corrigan, Operation Manipulation, 1977 NAT'L LJ. 1967; Government II, Uncle Sam's
Angels, TIME, May 8, 1978, at 29.
151. L TussMAN, GOVERNMENT AND THE MIND 99 (1977).
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ness that when totalitarian regimes assume power, their first acts ordi-
narily are to seize the media.'52 But an equally immediate concern of
such governments is to revise the public education system in accord-
ance with their values. 15 3 And worries that attach to the possibility of a
government-controlled media network 154 seem to be absent where the
government's role is that of educator in the public schools.
Government operation of a public education system seemingly
would be the basis for even more concern, given the captive and im-
pressionable audience in the classroom. But the division of educational
responsibility among various layers of governments and the classroom
autonomy of teachers combine to diminish the danger of government
monopolization of information and minds.155 Comparable diffusing el-
ements in the form of competing media outlets, therefore, should pro-
vide as effective a safeguard against undue influence as the public
school system enjoys.
The continuing presence of existing media outlets would stand as a
significant watchtower over government manipulations or distortions
by keeping "propaganda competitive, by throwing the door wide open
to everyone, so that every attempt at propaganda can be met by
counter-propaganda . . . .[T~he cure of propaganda is more propa-
ganda."' 15
6
A government that had its own channels of mass communication
thus would still be subject to the criticism and monitoring of private
broadcasters and publishers (and of the public if access to government
media facilities were permitted). The emergence of government as a
media power, therefore, should not be an occasion for new linedrawing
between government and private expression. Rather, the interests of
diversity would be promoted more effectively if government were per-
mitted to compete with equal opportunities in the media marketplace.
Government already has the freedom to establish public schools, so
long as it does not eliminate competition from private schools.'57 And
so long as government operated on a competitive rather than exclusive
basis, its media presence could be a significant boon, rather than haz-
ard, to first amendment values.
152. See H. ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALUTARNISM, Ch. 11 (1966).
153. See id
154. Media and the First Amendment, supra note 7, at 1028-31.
155. Yudof, When Governments Speak- Toward a Theory of Government Expression and the
First Amendment (unpublished paper delivered at First West Coast Conference on Constitutional
Law, Sept. 15, 1977) (copy on fie at the Pacfc Law Journal).
156. J. FRIEDRICH, MAN AND HIs GOVERNMENT- AN EMPIRICAL THEORY OF POLITICS 169
(1963).
157. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 381 U.S. 510 (1925). Such a rationale would permit govern-
ment "to add its own voice to the many that it must tolerate, provided it does not drown out our
private communications." L. TRINE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 589 (1978).
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C The More Media the Merrier
The casting of government into a leading role as media subsidizer or
media operator would represent a departure from past and present gov-
ernment performances. A preliminary consideration that should pre-
cede any such dramatic leap, however, is whether the cost and effort of
such endeavors would be essential ingredients for an affirmative action
recipe that should serve the future as well as the present.
Media subsidization or operation by the government would be most
sensible in the overall context of a static media structure. Such reme-
dies, however, might amount to overreaching in a media environment
subject to being shaped by the evolutionary and revolutionary influ-
ences of technological progress.
If existing media forms are to be protected and preferred species and
the beneficiaries of regulatory favoritism, 5 8 government subsidization
and operation may be among the few weapons available in the affirma-
tive action arsenal. But if new and existing media technologies 159 are
permitted to compete equally upon their own merits, the range upon
which affirmative action may roam would be considerably broadened.
The lowering of barriers to new media forms at least would pave the
way for more inter-media competition. Such a development could cre-
ate conditions ripe for more consistent rulemaking and regulation with
less cause for content regulation. Even if time, space, or competition
within an established or new medium were limited, the emergence of
more media forms would curb the power and importance of any one
medium. Such a dilution of influence, if it were to occur, would under-
mine any genuine basis for a scarcity rationale as a reason for regula-
tion. Consequently, the existing double standard between print and
broadcast media, which has become no more than an embarrassment to
those who invoke it,160 might be eliminated.
158. The FCC's regulation of cable television, for instance, has been more of a handicap than
an aid to the medium's development. The Commission denied a license for construction of a
CATV microwave relay station that would have been used to carry distant signals. The agency
concluded that a decision otherwise would have an adverse effect upon local television. Carter
Mountain Transmission Corp., 32 F.C.C. 459, 22 RR. 193 (1962), aft'd, 321 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir.
1963), cer. denied, 375 U.S. 951 (1963). The Commission since has adopted, modified, and some-
times deleted various cable rules against importing distant signals, regulations affording broad-
casters exclusive rights to certain types of programming, requirements for public access and local
origination, and prohibitions against siphoning programming that has been viewed without charge
on "free" television. Leapfrogging Rules, 57 F.C.C.2d 625, 35 R.R.2d 1673 (1976); Cable Televi-
sion Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, 24 R.R.2d 1501 (1972); 47 C.F.R. §§76.91-76.95 (1975);
Channel Capacity and Access Rules, 59 F.C.C.2d 294, 37 R.R.2d 213 (1976); Anti-siphoning
Rules, 47 C.F.R. §76.225 (1975).
159. Potential competitors for existing media forms "are springing from new technologies-
videocassettes, videodiscs, pay-TV, cable television, pay cable and satellite distribution systems."
U.S. NEws AND WORLD REPORT, June 19, 1978, at 83.
160. The Supreme Court acknowledged the reality of scarcity and concentration in the news-
paper industry in Miami Herald Pubishing Company v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241,250 (1974). But the
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The arrival of new media forms would not dictate a shift from a "do
something" to a "do nothing" government role as much as it would
necessitate an undoing of policymaking that plays favorites with tradi-
tional media forms over emerging ones. 16 1 The government, in chang-
ing its ways, however, should not abdicate its role as an economic
regulator. The reduction of power in the hands of a government over-
lord would be an insignificant accomplishment if the same power were
subsequently assumed by and vested in the hands of a few private over-
lords.
The encouragement and welcoming of new media forms, however,
need not exclude them from regulatory scrutiny for characteristics that
would undermine diversity. The cable industry, for instance, has of-
fered itself as a tonic for what ails diversity. 162 Even though cable op-
erators can deliver more channels, and thus more information outlets,
the cable business itself is a model of a highly concentrated, vertically
integrated industry.'63 If inter-media competition alone proved to be
an inadequate safeguard for diversity, regulatory solutions should be
available to the government. But the regulatory cure, especially in the
presence of more types of media, could be an economic or structural
one rather than a content-oriented one. Regulation that required sepa-
ration of ownership and control between programming and distribu-
tion functions, for instance, might advance the cause of affirmative
action more efficiently and less intrusively than programming inspec-
tion.
Given the potential for significant changes in the nature of the mass
media, a sound affirmative action policy would be one that not only
accepted the alterations and additions but also would adapt to and en-
Court wrote its Tornillo opinion as if Red Lion Broadcasting Company v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367
(1967), did not exist. Not once in Tornillo did the Court even mention the Red Lion scarcity
rationale that has become the basis for broadcasting regulation. The Court thus left the impres-
sion that it would rather avoid the inconsistency altogether by refusing to face the incongruity.
161. The FCC and the courts have manifested recent moves toward eliminating some of the
barriers for new media technologies and forms. The Commission itself lifted rules against impor-
tation of distant television signals by cable operators. Leapfrogging Rules, 57 F.C.C.2d 625, 35
R.R.2d 1673 (1976). A federal appeals court rejected the agency's origination and access require-
ments for cablecasters. Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025 (8th Cir. 1978). And the
chairman of the FCC has issued warnings to broadcasters to prepare themselves for competition
from a new wave of media technology. Speeches of FCC Chairman Charles Ferris to National
Association of Broadcasters, April 24, 1978, Las Vegas, Nevada, and at Network Inquiry Sympo-
sium, Feb. 2, 1979, Los Angeles, California (copy on file at the Pac~fc Law Journal).
162. S. BAER, CABLE TELEVISION: A HANDBOOK FOR DECISION MAKING 177 (1973); Price,
Requiemfor a Wired Nation: Cable Rulemaking at the FCC, 61 VA. L. REv. 541, 546-51 (1975).
The United States Supreme Court itself has noted that "the advent of cable television will afford
increased opportunities for the discussion of public issues." CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412
U.S. 94, 131 (1973). A detailed listing of cable's potential contributions to diversity and other
potential uses was set forth in Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 141, 144 n.10
(1972).
163. Goldberg and Couzens, "Peculiar Characteristics' 4nalysis of the First Amendment Im-
plications of Broadcast Regulation, 31 FED. COMM. L.J. 1, 50 (1978).
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courage those new realities. Such circumstances, though, inevitably
would insist upon the departure from interventionist actions and stan-
dards aimed at forcing diversity out of the status quo. And they would
summon the arrival of a revised policy that built upon and beyond
traditional media forms to encourage more information sources and
products.
CONCLUSION
The classic concept of freedom of the press as a restraint upon gov-
ernment has limited worth for a society that has grown up with a con-
centrated media industry unforeseen by the constitution's architects.
The limited tools so far employed in building diversity into the existing
media framework have failed to serve first amendment values and in-
terests adequately.
Past experience dictates that future affirmative action policies should
be carefully selected and applied to enhance rather than to undermine
first amendment interests. Less effective and more intrusive regulatory
policies now in effect equip the government with the weapons for sub-
verting such interests in the name of fairness, balance, and preserva-
tion. And so long as the government chooses to wield the reins of
regulation over content, the flow of information will remain subject to
scrutiny and control by government, as well as by private, centers of
power. Such leverage reveals the flimsiness of first amendment guaran-
tees, especially in their ability to serve first amendment values, in the
face of existing policies. And it continues to validate the answer Alex-
ander Hamilton furnished his own question 200 years ago.
What is the liberty of the press? Who can give it any definition
which would not leave the utmost latitude of evasion? I hold It to be
impracticable; and for this I infer, that its security, whatever fine dec-
larations may be inserted in any constitution respecting it, must alto-
gether depend on public opinion and on the general spirit of the
people and of the Government.' 64
If government is to serve any worthwhile first amendment purpose, it
should be one of policymaking that promotes rather than inhibits first
amendment values. An affirmative action policy that is also an effec-
tive first amendment policy, therefore, not only must safeguard a mar-
ketplace of ideas but must help keep the shelves well stocked with a
diverse selection of information products.
164. THE FEDERALIST No. 84 (A. Hamilton), reprntedin 43 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN
WORLD 253 (1971).
